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America's Unfairest Taxes:
Tariffs and Quotas

by
James Bovard
NCPA Policy Report No. 171
May 1992


Executive Summary

If Congress is in the mood to make the tax code "fairer," a good place to start is with America's unfairest taxes: tariffs and quotas.

In 1790, the Tariff Code consisted of a single sheet of paper. Today, there are more than 8,757 tariffs - plus vast numbers of quotas, so-called voluntary import restraints and other import restrictions. All too often these barriers to trade impose their greatest burdens on low-income families. Consider that:

Tariffs and quotas cost consumers $80 billion per year - about $800 for every American family. Yet the burden of these restrictions does not fall evenly. Some of the tightest restrictions are reserved for food and clothing - which make up a large share of low-income families' budgets. For example, the same U.S. government that currently spends about $28 billion a year on 13 different food assistance programs also makes sure that low-income families don't turn to inexpensive foreign food. On the average: Overall, trade barriers almost always hurt more than they help. The U.S. economy would gain even if the United States eliminated trade barriers unilaterally. If other countries also reduced their trade barriers, the United States would benefit even more.

Introduction

Lee Iacocca, America's premier protectionist, recently declared that the United States is "the last bastion of free trade."1 But, in reality, U.S. trade policy is far more protectionist than most Americans realize:2 As politicians propose new trade barriers and import quotas, it is more important than ever to understand the extent of existing U.S. trade barriers. The U.S. tariff code is the accumulated result of more than a hundred years of political payoffs and kickbacks. In general, the tariff code makes no sense in terms of well-defined economic or social objectives. Instead, it is an indicator of the historical political clout of various Washington lobbies. While the average tariff is now around 5 percent, some are in the stratosphere. Low-priced watch parts are hit with a 151.2 percent tariff,3 tobacco stems must pay 458.3 percent,4 and the tariff on some shoe imports is 67 percent.5 The tariff code often helps one American industry by sacrificing another:6 Overall, the U.S. tariff code looks like a variable value-added tax devised in an lunatic asylum. The tariff on brooms is 42.3 percent, thereby safeguarding dust and dirt; the tariff on flashlights is 25 percent, thereby encouraging people to break their noses in the dark; the tariff on cheap scissors is 23.6 percent, thereby encouraging people to tear things apart with their bare hands.

America's tariff makers perceive vast differences between similar products that ordinary mortals miss. The tariff on duck liver is sixteen times higher than the tariff on goose liver. The tariff on wine with low alcoholic content is six times higher than on wine with high alcoholic content.

Every trade barrier undermines the productivity of capital and labor throughout the economy:

"By one estimate, trade barriers cost consumers eight to ten times as much as they benefit producers."

Tariffs: America's Taxes on the Poor

The U.S. Tariff Code encourages the poor to raise their standard of living by imposing the highest tariffs on products low-income families are most likely to buy.11 The following are some examples.

Higher Tariffs for Lower-Priced Goods. As Figure I shows, U.S. tariffs and quotas are much less burdensome for families who buy higher-priced products:

Food. U.S. tariff policy implicitly assumes that it is better for the poor to go hungry than to buy inexpensive foreign food. Table I shows a few of the more than 500 different tariffs the U.S. imposes to deter foreign food from invading American stomachs. Ironically, the U.S. government spends over $28 billion each year on 13 different food assistance programs. Taxpayers are hit twice - once to pay salaries of Customs agents to keep out low-priced foreign food and a second time to feed low-income Americans hurt by high food prices.

"Tariff policy implicitly assumes that it is better to go hungry than to buy inexpensive foreign food."

Clothing. William Cline of the Institute for International Economics estimates that:13

These burdens hit poor families far harder than rich families. Tariffs and import restrictions are much more punitive for low-cost clothes made of polyester and other man-made fibers than for higher-cost cotton clothing.

"Clothing quotas and tariffs amount to a hidden tax of almost $400 a year per family."

Tariffs: Resisting the Desire for
Health and Safety

While some agencies are willing to force the private sector to spend tens of billions of dollars to hypothetically save a single life,16 U.S. customs laws resist mightily this excessive concern with health and safety. The following are some examples.

Vitamins, Drugs and Medical Equipment. Congress apparently believes that not all the malnourished should be treated equally. Vitamin B12, which is necessary to prevent and treat anemia and is no longer produced in the United States, is hit with a 16.2 percent tariff, while vitamin B2, vital for avoiding stunted growth, is tariffed at only 7.8 percent. Vitamin C carries a 3 percent tariff, while vitamin E is hit with a 7 percent levy. Looking at tariffs on medicine and medical equipment, one might think that tariff policy is secretly controlled by Christian Scientists. Aspirin carries a 10.2 percent tariff, which encourages people not to get headaches. The tariff on antidepressants and tranquilizers is 16.6 percent, encouraging people to see therapists. And Congress deters the import of sulfathiazole, an anti-infective agent, with a 15 percent tariff. [See Figure II.]

Death by Tariff. Higher prices caused by tariffs often result in fewer people using lifesaving drugs or equipment. In 1984, a West German company developed a lithotripter that destroys kidney stones with shock waves. This might have been seen as a blessing. More than 250,000 people a year enter hospitals for kidney stone treatment, 1,149 people died of complications resulting from kidney stones in 1985,17 and the German machine was a vast improvement over the surgical removal of kidney stones. Although no American companies were producing competing machines, the U.S. levied a 7.9 percent tariff on the German product. The Saint Joseph Medical Center of Burbank, California, paid a $189,964.32 tariff on a single lithotripter. The high tariff strongly discouraged more American hospitals from purchasing the machine. As a result, thousands of Americans in the mid- to late-1980s had to undergo painful surgery and relatively long recuperation.18 (The recuperation time for shock-wave treatment is less than half that for traditional kidney surgery.) Many deaths from kidney stones and kidney stone surgery could have been avoided if the U.S. tariff code had not discouraged the adoption of this new technology.

"One hospital paid a $189,964.32 tariff on a single lithotripter."

Safety. The tariff on a special wool blend fabric used to make firefighters' protective garments is 33 percent.19 When Rep. Robert Roe (D-NJ) proposed in 1988 to reduce this tariff, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) objected. Even though American companies did not produce the fabric, ATMI thought some might do so if the tariff were kept high. A few more singed firemen was apparently a small price to pay for the possibility that a domestic firm might deign to make a fabric already supplied by foreign companies.

Tearing the Shirt Off Americans' Backs

The U.S. now imposes more than 3,000 separate quotas on clothing and textiles from 40 nations.20 The government restricts imports of tampons, typewriter ribbons, tarpaulins, twine, table linens, tapestries, ties and hundreds of other items. U.S. textile trade policy is based on the view that clothes are among the most dangerous objects a nation can import - thus imports of mittens, socks and handkerchiefs must be more strictly controlled than imports of pistols, rifles and nuclear reactor parts.

Commerce Department officials could not tell the author the precise number of different items covered by import quotas. Some of the items listed as restricted in Commerce's guide to textile import quotas are shown in Table II. Even the plastic net in which oranges are sold is a textile product, subject to quota restrictions.21

"Imports of mittens, socks and handerchiefs are more strictly controlled than imports of pistols, rifles and nuclear reactor parts."

The MFA Agreement. In 1973 and 1974, the leading textile exporters and importers gathered in Geneva to hammer out new international rules for textile trade. The Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) was the result. The preamble announced that the MFA sought "the reduction of [textile] trade barriers and the liberalization of world trade."22 Developing nations were enticed to sign the MFA because it promised that exports to developed countries would be allowed to increase "at least 6 percent per year for those imports subject to specified limits."23

Clothing production requires little skill or capital; its main requirement is people who need to work. Since low-wage Third World nations have a natural competitive advantage in labor-intensive activities, the MFA was supposed to be a transitional arrangement to help richer countries phase out of an uncompetitive industry.

Instead, the MFA allowed wealthy importing nations to shackle poorer exporting nations. The MFA was extended in 1978, in 1981 and again in 1986, and each extension further emaciated the 6 percent growth pledge.24 The 1986 extension expanded the types of clothing covered by the arrangement to include silk, ramie and even glass fibers.

"Sri Lanka was allowed to export only a dozen men's and boys' coats to the U.S. in seven months."

Avoiding "Market Disruptions." The MFA allows nations to restrict textile imports if a threat of "market disruption" occurs. Market disruption is defined as a significant increase of imports of particular products from a particular country at prices below those prevailing in the importing nation's market.25 If clothing prices decrease - or if there is any chance that prices could decrease - the market is "disrupted". But if clothing prices increase, the market is judged to be doing just fine. Imports are presumed guilty until proven innocent. Poor countries must prove that their exports are not disrupting the rich nation's economy, while rich nations need not prove the harm.

U.S. Vigilance. In general, the MFA protects Americans only from low-price clothing. Those who purchase expensive clothes are usually permitted to buy duty free.

The United States is also vigilant against even trace elements of textile imports: Diapers. In 1988, only one U.S. factory produced cotton diapers. The factory employed only 60 workers, and even the factory owner conceded that imported cotton diapers were of higher quality. Yet the United States imposed an extremely low diaper quota on China, the only supplier of cotton diapers to America. Gary Holmes, a spokesman for the U.S. Trade Representative, said the quotas were imposed because the domestic diaper industry "told us they were being killed by imports."30 The quota caused a severe diaper shortage, and the domestic manufacturer quickly raised prices 27 percent. Nan Scott, a spokesperson for the domestic diaper service businesses, told columnist Warren Brookes, "Our orders have been cut by 50 to 75 percent, we have to turn down new customers, and we are piling up the overtime. The U.S. suppliers have done nothing to give us a quality product at any price. They just wanted to shut the competition in Asia down."31 Roughly 40,000 people are employed by diaper services, including drivers, office and sales personnel and people who launder and package diapers.32 Thus, federal textile policy endangered over 700 jobs in the diaper service business for each job protected at the South Carolina diaper factory.

Luggage and Handbags. In 1984, a U.S. government employee apparently awoke one morning with the realization that the U.S. should be restricting imports of luggage and handbags. Now, because a foreign handbag or piece of luggage has a small amount of cotton or polyester in its cover - perhaps only 10 percent of its total value - it can be banned in order to protect the U.S. textile industry. The United States has practically no companies producing low-priced, relatively low quality luggage and handbags - the types hit hardest by import quotas. Handbag quotas have been an effective recycling policy, encouraging the poor to carry their belongings around in grocery bags.

Tennis Shoes. Importers have also been hammered by constant changes in the textile import classifications. For example, Customs Service officials worked overtime in late 1989 to protect America against foreign shoestrings. Customs prohibited the import of a shipment of 30,000 pairs of tennis shoes from Indonesia because each shoe box contained an extra pair of shoelaces. One Customs official decided the extra laces were a clothing product that required a separate quota license for importing, and his decision set a precedent for the entire Customs Service.33 None of the tennis shoe importers were thinking of the extra laces as anything but part of the tennis shoe and thus were caught without quota rights for shoestrings.34 (Some new tennis shoes have eyelets for more than one set of laces.) Customs proceeded to establish intricate rules for shoelace imports, and the U.S. government judiciously announced that an extra pair of laces would be permitted in a box of tennis shoes as long as they were laced into the shoes and were color-coordinated with the shoes.

"30,000 pairs of tennis shoes from Indonesia were barred because each box had an extra pair of shoelaces."

But Customs warned importers, "We note that where multiple pairs of laces of like colors and/or designs are imported, ... a presumption is raised" that the shoelaces are not actually part of the shoe.35

Detecting Evasions. MFA quotas force American retailers and importers to rely on island-hopping - jumping from ocean to ocean to stay ahead of U.S. government prohibitions against their suppliers' exports. The U.S. is currently importing trousers and shirts from more than 130 countries, including Oman, Laos and the Tokelau Islands.36 As import sources have proliferated, so too have Customs Service investigations of possible transshipping of products from nations that have exhausted their quota to those which have not. When Customs sent a team to Kuwait in July 1990, it considered the operation a great success because inspectors found a small amount of transshipped clothing. It was regrettable that the U.S. team, "preoccupied with counting sweaters, failed to notice and warn of the impending Iraqi invasion, which occurred a few days later."37 In 1990, Mozambique - a war-torn, dirt-poor southern African nation - made the list of Customs Service textile evasion suspects. One trade expert predicts, "The next thing you know, Customs will be investigating exports from Antarctica - you know you can't trust those penguins."38

Promoting "Fair" Trade. The United States has peculiar notions of injury when it judges our imports from foreign nations and our exports to them. For example, the U.S. government perennially badgers the Thai government about the alleged harm that Thai cotton apparel is inflicting on the U.S. market, imposing one new restriction after another. At the same time, the United States Trade Representative was indignant when Thailand refused to allow U.S. cigarette exports. (The Thai government is running an extensive antismoking campaign and feared that a flood of advertising by American companies would counteract its efforts.) Apparently, a minuscule decrease in shirt prices can harm a nation, while an increase in lung cancer and emphysema cannot.

Cost to Consumers. Quotas transfer money from American consumers to foreign producers and quota-holders and to American textile and clothing companies. They help American textile and clothing companies by restricting their competition and allowing them to charge higher prices. The 1989 Economic Report of the President concluded that tariffs and quota restrictions produce an average effective tariff charge of over 50 percent for apparel imports.39 Tariffs for clothing items vary sharply, and some quota categories are far more restrictive than others. According to the International Trade Commission:40

"Restrictions produce an average effective tariff charge of more than 50 percent for apparel imports."
Quotas have become extremely valuable in themselves. Hong Kong has a quota auction at which private companies bid for government sanction to export clothing and textile products. In some cases, companies spend more to buy the quota right than to produce the export item:

Protecting Consumers From Foreign Food

For cotton, sugar, cheese, ice cream and peanuts, "fair trade" now consists of numbers pulled out of a hat by politicians and bureaucrats. Jan Tumlir, former chief economist of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organization, estimated in 1985 that quotas were affecting up to 50 percent of all world trade.43

Dairy Products. The United States allows only minuscule imports of most dairy products. [SeeFigure III.] For example:44

In early 1989, world nonfat dry milk prices were (for the first time in decades) higher than U.S. prices. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided generous export subsidies, and U.S. companies quickly exported 370 million pounds of nonfat dry milk - 40 percent of annual U.S. production. By late 1989, world dry milk prices had plummeted, while the U.S. dry milk price had almost tripled. But our strict quotas prevented imports from entering the U.S. and driving United States prices down to world price levels. As a result, the U.S. experienced a severe domestic shortage of dry milk.

Dry milk is a key ingredient in bakery products, chocolate, cake mixes, dog biscuits and crackers. The dry milk shortage prevented many American companies from purchasing milk at any price, and food production workers were laid off as factories slashed production. The Chocolate Manufacturers Association, American Bakers Association and National Confectioners Association petitioned USDA Secretary Clayton Yeutter to temporarily waive dairy import quotas. The Agriculture Department denied the request. A high-ranking USDA official declared that the agency did not want to "micro-manage" the dairy supply. In other words, it was okay for the government to subsidize the export of dry milk, but allowing the import of unsubsidized dry milk would interfere in the marketplace.45

""182 nations combined may sell us only two pounds of Edam and Gouda cheese."

Dairy quotas originated in the Defense Production Act of 1951, when Congress apparently decided that allowing Americans to consume sufficient amounts of calcium might undermine the national defense. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the U.S. provided millions of dollars in aid under the Marshall Plan to help Danish, Dutch and other European dairy farmers rebuild. Then a Wisconsin Republican congressman stuck a rider onto an appropriations bill and, with a few sentences, torpedoed thousands of European dairy farmers. A New York Times editorial condemned the new dairy quotas: "We destroy the confidence of our European friends in the consistency - even the sanity - of American trade policy and we violate our own commitments in the GATT."46 President Lyndon Johnson expanded the cheese quotas on January 6, 1969 to include chocolate crumb cheese imports.47 In 1979, the dairy regulatory system imposed quotas on almost all cow's. milk cheeses that had previously entered quota-free. Dairy trade issues have long been a major bone of contention with foreign nations.

Each cheese quota decrees the precise number of pounds of each type of cheese other nations are allowed to sell to Americans. For example:48

Dairy quotas were imposed because politicians resolved that American farmers should receive far more than market value for their milk - and the only way they could politically do this was to restrict foreign competition. Without quotas, the actual subsidy that dairymen received would be stark and politically untenable. Dairy products account for 13 percent of the average consumer's food budget.51 Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) notes, "Families with incomes below $10,000 spend three times as much of their disposable income on milk as do households with incomes between $30,000 and $40,000."52 Thanks in part to the dairy program, calcium has long been the nutrient that poor people lack most. Higher milk prices have also contributed to osteoporosis in the elderly. But since the poor and elderly don't contribute $2 million a year to political campaigns as the dairy lobby does, malnourished ghetto children and brittle-boned elderly are largely ignored.

"American sugar prices have been double, triple or quadruple the world sugar price."

Sugar. The U.S. government has been heavily protecting or directly subsidizing the sugar industry since 1816. For almost the entire history of the United States, American sugar prices have been held at double, triple or quadruple the world sugar price. In the 1820s, sugar plantation owners complained that growing sugar in the U.S. was "warring with nature" because the U.S. climate was unsuited to sugar production.53 Naturally, the plantation owners believed that all Americans should be conscripted into the "war." Because the sugar lobby makes generous campaign contributions, politicians seemingly resolved that consumers should pay any price and bear any burden for domestic sugar production.

Since 1980, the sugar program has cost consumers and taxpayers more than $2 million for each American sugar grower. Congress justifies the sugar program as a protection from the "roller-coaster of international sugar prices."54 Unfortunately, Congress protects consumers against the effects of the ride by pegging American sugar prices on a level with the Goodyear blimp. U.S. sugar prices have been as high as or higher than world prices for 39 of the last 41 years.

"Since 1980, the sugar program has cost consumers and taxpayers more than $2 million for each American sugar grower."

The sugar program has been a great inflationary success. At one point, sugar sold for 21 cents a pound in the U.S. when the world sugar price was less than 3 cents a pound. In general:

The Brach Candy Company announced in early 1990 plans to close its Chicago candy factory and relocate 3,000 jobs to Canada because of the high cost of sugar in the United States.56 Thanks to the cutback in sugar imports, ten sugar refineries have closed in recent years and 7,000 refinery jobs have been lost.57 Overall, the number of American jobs destroyed by sugar quotas since 1980 exceeds the total number of sugar farmers in the United States:58

"The number of jobs destroyed by sugar quotas since 1980 exceeds the total number of sugar farmers."
The U.S. government's generosity to sugar farmers has victimized other American businesses. Brazil retaliated against the U.S. for cutting its sugar quota by reducing its purchases of American grain. In the Dominican Republic, former sugar growers are now producing wheat and corn in competition with American farmers. American candy producers are disadvantaged because foreign companies can buy sugar at much lower prices. Since 1982, dextrose and confectionery coating imports have risen tenfold and chocolate imports are up fivefold.

The sugar program has also decreased soybean exports. In the Red River Valley of Minnesota, heavily subsidized sugar growers have bid up the rents on farmland by more than 50 percent. As a result, relatively unsubsidized soybean farmers can no longer obtain enough land for soybeans - America's premier export crop.59 This illustrates how restrictions on imports become restrictions on exports.

Peanuts. Since 1953, Americans have been permitted to buy only 1.7 million pounds of foreign peanuts each year.60 This amounts to two foreign peanuts per year for each American citizen. The peanut import quota helps keep U.S. peanut prices far higher than world prices. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that the import quota was the equivalent of a tariff of up to 90 percent on peanut imports in 1988.61 The import quota, along with federal price supports and feudal restrictions on who is allowed to grow peanuts, guarantee peanut farmers generous profits.

The stringent peanut quota is a serious hazard to U.S. food processors. In 1990, a severe drought hit Georgia, where almost half of all U.S. peanuts are grown, causing a severe shortage and a doubling of peanut prices. When the International Trade Commission announced that it was considering investigating the peanut industry, it was besieged by comments from desperate food processors. Ed Goodrich, president of Plantation Peanuts in Wakefield, Virginia, observed, "We are now faced with the possibility of having to shut down."62 King Nut Co. of Solon, Ohio, complained, "We have been [unable to purchase any] Jumbo runner peanuts for three weeks." A Southeast peanut confectionery company saw its sales fall 80 percent. Barcelona Nuts, a Maryland company, was forced to lay off 20 percent of its workers. Even so, the Agriculture Department opposed additional peanut import allowances.63

"Each American is allowed to import two peanuts per year."

Beef. The U.S. also imposes quotas on beef and veal imports. Congress first restricted beef imports in 1965, then revised the quota system in 1979. Today, the beef quota is based on the ratio of current beef production to average beef production for the years 1968-1977.64 The restraint on beef exports from Argentina has contributed to that nation's repeated default on interest payments on its $65 billion foreign debt. The USDA estimates that these restraints cost American consumers $873 million in 1987.65

Slamming the Brakes on American Consumers

In 1981, the Reagan administration arm-twisted the Japanese government into restricting Japanese auto exports to the United States. Consumers suffered as a result:
"Japanese cars sold for 45 percent more in the Uniited States than in Japan."
William Niskanen, chair of the Reagan administration's Council of Economic Advisers, asserted that the voluntary restraint agreement "increased the cost of the domestic industry labor contracts negotiated in 1984 and 1985, probably preventing the domestic industry from being competitive in the production of small cars."71

Despite more than ten years of protection, American cars continue to be less reliable than Japanese cars: American cars still have over 50 percent more defects.72 The 1990 Consumer Reports survey of car quality "found that 28 of the 31 best-rated models for quality were Japanese. Likewise, of the 33 worst-rated models, all but one were Big Three products."73 Consumer Reports noted that "for each GM owner who said he liked his car and would buy the same model again, six others said just the opposite."74 J.D. Powers and Associates, a California market research company, found that "Japanese car makers widened their quality advantage over U.S. car makers by 11.4 percent in 1989, based on problems in the first 90 days of new car ownership."75 When Lee Iacocca was asked about Japanese comments about the comparative low quality of American cars in early 1992, Iacocca replied, "We don't have to apologize to anybody. We're the leaders of the world."76

In early 1991, Ford and Chrysler announced demands for new cutbacks in the level of Japanese imports. Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-MO) sent a letter to Japan's Prime Minister Taichi Kaifu urging a "meaningful" restraint on auto exports. Ford and Chrysler even sought restraints on the combined number of cars sold by Japanese auto plants both in Japan and in the U.S. Then Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher, in a speech in Tokyo on April 3, 1991, complained that the U.S. auto market was suffering from "oversupply" and warned that the U.S. "will be enforcing our laws ... concerning anti-dumping."77 Japan's largest financial newspaper reported that Mosbacher asked the Japanese government to further restrain auto exports.78 Officials at Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) declared last year that they were pressuring Japan's auto makers both to hold back exports to the U.S. and to hold down output at their U.S. auto plants - which meant fewer jobs for American workers.79 MITI again reportedly asked Toyota in late January 1992 to reduce its car exports to the U.S.80

"Ford and Chrysler even sought restraints on the combined number of cars sold by Japanese auto plants both in Japan and in the U.S."

Unfair Trade

Tariffs, quotas and voluntary restraint agreements are direct and obvious ways of limiting imports. But Customs' arsenal contains other weapons as well. For example, imports can be halted if the exporting county is found guilty of "dumping."

Recently, the U.S. Commerce Department accused Korean and Hong Kong sweater producers of dumping because they sold sweaters more cheaply in the United States than in other countries:81

There are other ways of committing dumping "crimes." Under U.S. law, any foreign company earning less than 8 percent profit on a product is judged to be prima facie guilty of selling at a loss.

Because of the Commerce Department's protectionist actions:82

The U.S. vs. Japan: Who is More Protectionist?

Sen. Donald Riegle (D-MI) recently declared that the U.S. has "the most open [economic] system" and that "Japan has the most closed system" and denounced "the persistent pattern of Japanese trade cheating."83 But, in reality, Japan is far less protectionist than some American politicians claim.

The average U.S. tariff is between 5 and 6 percent, while the average Japanese tariff is between 3 and 4 percent. More importantly, the U.S. has far more products (over 3,600) restricted by import quotas than does Japan. The Japanese impose import quotas on American agricultural products, while the U.S. imposes import quotas on Japanese machine tools, autos, textiles and steel, and on such dairy products as cheese, ice cream and cream.

"Any foreign company earning less than 8 percent profit on a product is judged to be prima facie guilty of selling at a loss."

There is no question that the Japanese have often been as creative with trade barriers as they have been with manufacturing processes. Dutch tulip bulb exports to Japan were long stifled because Japanese customs inspectors insisted on personally opening and inspecting each tulip bulb. Japanese restrictions on foreign investments have justifiably infuriated many American corporations.

Partly because U.S. criticism of Japan increased sharply after President Bush's recent visit to Tokyo, MITI announced in mid-March that it was reducing by 80,000 the number of autos that Japanese companies could ship to the United States (from 1.73 million cars to 1.65 million). The Japanese government reportedly did this to alleviate criticism of Japan in the United States. But, predictably, the tactic backfired. Chrysler Corp. quickly issued an official statement declaring, "We believe that to be meaningful the Voluntary Export Restraint levels should be significantly reduced, perhaps to one million units a year or less, to get back to a level playing field for everybody."84 General Motors criticized the Japanese government for giving "the misleading impression that something meaningful is being done to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with Japan."85 The United Auto Workers denounced the export cutback as "yet another hollow gesture from Japan."86 Yet the cutback in auto exports could have a heavy impact on American consumers. The U.S. International Trade Commission's Walker Pollard estimates that the cutbacks could add up to $1,000 to the cost of a new Japanese car in the United States.87

Listening to current rhetoric, one would think that no U.S. company is selling a single widget in the Land of the Rising Sun. The facts say otherwise. The typical Japanese spends more on American products ($372) than the typical American spends on Japanese products ($357).88 Coke and Pepsi dominate the soft drink market, and Oreos are the most popular cookie in Japan. Schick commands 70 percent of the safety razor blade market.

"The typical Japanese spends more on American products than the typical American spends on Japanese products."

Many American businesses have blamed the Japanese when the fault lies with their own feeble sales efforts. In Japan, most cars have the steering wheels on the right side. Yet American car makers continue to denounce the Japanese for not buying American-made autos with steering wheels on the left side. Chrysler spends only a million dollars in advertising in Japan - less than one-fourth of Lee Iacocca's salary.

The General Accounting Office reported that American pork exports to Japan are lower than they otherwise could be because American pork packers refuse to cut the pork into the smaller portions that Japanese consumers prefer. Maybe the next trade war will seek to force Japanese consumers to take Texas-size slabs of ham and pork chops at their evening meals.

In 1990, Congress imposed a log export ban primarily to attempt to force Japan to buy more cut lumber instead of logs from the United States. Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR) complained, "Unfair trading nations like Japan are buying every American log they can lay their hands on." Apparently, it is not enough for the Japanese to buy American products; they must buy exactly the products that congressmen choose. Seeking to force the Japanese to buy American cut lumber instead of logs is as senseless as trying to force other nations to buy barrels of American wheat flour instead of bushels of American wheat.

Similarly, Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT) complained in 1989, "Invisible barriers that we should define as cultural restrictions, a preference of a Japanese to do business with another Japanese, these take time to bring down." Preferring to do business with people who speak your language is apparently unfair discrimination against all those who have not bothered to learn it.

Many politicians want to pillory Japan because the Japanese had a trade surplus of more than $41 billion with the U.S. last year. But a 1985 Federal Reserve Bank of New York study estimated that only $5 billion to $8 billion of the U.S. - Japan trade deficit is due to Japanese trade barriers.89 A U.S. International Trade Commission study of a proposed free trade zone with Japan noted that if all trade barriers were abolished the U.S. trade deficit with Japan might actually increase.90

"If all Japanese trade barriers against the U.S. were abolished, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan might actually increase."

The recent auto trade agreement between the United States and Japan vivifies the hypocritical nature of managed trade. Both Ford and General Motors are now receiving financial aid from the Japanese government to build up their operations in Japan.91 If the Japanese provided the same type of aid to Japanese companies, American auto makers would almost certainly file a lawsuit to punish Japanese imports that benefited from the subsidies. But apparently it is okay for American companies to accept handouts from foreign governments.

Many Americans believe that Japan is hopelessly protectionist because of the keiretsu system, a system of interlocking corporate ties, with corporations owning large blocks of one another's shares, and with the same people on their boards of directors. But, as the Boston Globe reported in January, "A survey of American companies operating in Japan found that 74 percent considered that the keiretsu either had a beneficial effect on their own businesses - long-established American businesses have developed strong connections with Japanese counterparts, becoming keiretsu themselves - or no effect at all."92

We should postpone penalizing the Japanese for their trade barriers at least until American companies build equally good products and until American companies work as hard at exporting. Between 1970 and 1985, manufacturing productivity increased almost three times as fast in Japan as in the United States. The Japanese have made a cult of quality control, while U.S. companies have long scorned quality considerations and now offer them lip service only.

Further, the U.S. has difficulty competing with Japan partly because U.S. taxes are much higher. Government spending accounts for over 43 percent of the U.S. gross national product and only 28 percent of Japan's GNP. The Japanese savings rate is more than double the U.S. savings rate, partly because the Japanese government commandeers far less of its workers' paychecks.

Conclusion

"Poorer but nobler" is the implicit motto of federal trade policy makers. Although U.S. trade policy means that Americans have fewer sweaters, coats and autos and less cheese and orange juice, America is supposedly a better place because of these trade restrictions. And what is their sole effect? Higher prices for some domestic goods. That is the only thing most protectionist measures have achieved and the only thing they will ever achieve.

U.S. trade policy has been an unending war against abundance. Do we really need tens of thousands of government bureaucrats working to reduce the living standard and buying power of Americans? Do we need federal employees counting each arriving handkerchief from the Third World, weighing each keg of incoming cheese and numbering the shoestrings in each box of tennis shoes? Nothing in the preamble of the U.S. Constitution mentioned forming "a more perfect Union" in order to prevent Americans from eating foreign ice cream.

"The only thing most protectionist measures have achieved is higher prices for consumer goods."

Restricting Americans' opportunity to buy and sell cannot make America richer. Protectionism is the ultimate "less is more" policy - based on the idea that the U.S. will become richer if the government forces Americans to pay higher prices for fewer goods. Every trade barrier imposes an opportunity cost on the American economy.

The fewer trade barriers the U.S. has, the more competitive American companies will be. The fewer crutches the government provides, the faster American industry will run. Should we hold U.S. productivity hostage to the stubbornness or stupidity of foreign trade policy makers? Should the U.S. wait until it receives a foreign bribe before it follows its own interest? Are the tattered clothes of poor Americans something we should be proud of? Is a federal sugar policy that drives American food manufacturers overseas a national asset?

Trade allows consumers everywhere a chance to benefit from increases in productivity anywhere. As Emerson observed, "If a talent is anywhere born into the world, the community of nations is enriched."93 Trade binds humanity together in laboring for mutual benefits. The expansion of trade between the end of World War II and the 1980s produced the greatest era of prosperity in world history.

The fundamental issue is not whether foreign governments treat American companies fairly, but whether the U.S. government treats American citizens fairly. We should cease punishing American consumers for other nations' alleged sins. The question is not whether trade barriers exist abroad, but whether we should allow them to persist here. The time has come to deregulate our national borders - to end the medieval pursuit of a "just price" for imports - and to cease allowing government officials to have economic life-and-death power over American businesses. Charging low prices to American consumers should not be a federal crime.





NOTE: Nothing written here should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the National Center for Policy Analysis or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.


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